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Abstract 
This study explores the determinants of capital structure of UK FTSE 100 firms. The aim is to examine the 
impact of profitability (ROA), non-debt tax shield (NDTS), tangibility (TANG), liquidity (LIQ), growth(GR) 
and size on the choice of debt in the capital structure of firms. The study uses a panel data fixed effect approach 
to examine the determinants of capital structure over a ten year period, from 2003 to 2012. The results show that 
profitability has a negative relationship with the long term debt, short term debt and total debt, consistent with 
the Pecking Order Theory (POT) of capital structure which states that a firm's desire to use leverage is driven by 
internal forces and information asymmetry and thus, managers rely on internal funding or retained earnings to 
finance assets or investment opportunity. Size and NDTS show a positive relationship. The Non debt tax shield 
rejected the Trade-off Theory (TOT) of capital structure. However, the positive effect of size is consistent with 
the prediction of the TOT which states that firms determine their capital structure by trading off the benefit and 
the cost of debt. Accordingly, the firms in the FTSE 100 are considered as big firms and bigger firms are viewed 
as less risky and well diversified by lenders. The remaining variables showed mixed impact on gearing. 
Generally, the coefficient of ROA, NDTS, TANG, LIQ and SIZE were statistically significant but the coefficient 
of growth was insignificant. Overall, the results of the research show some support for both Pecking Order 
Theory and Trade off Theory of capital structure. Evidence also supports Agency Cost Theory of capital 
structure 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Determinants, FTSE 100 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In an advanced economy such as the United Kingdom, the capital structure decision is one of the most important 
decisions of the financial manager, especially in times of economic uncertainty. The primary objective of any 
financial manager is to increase the value of the firm and create wealth for shareholders. Thus, an understanding 
of the factors that influence the choice of debt will assist financial managers in making the decision as to the 
borrowing capacity, benefits and costs to the firm. Also, due to the tax shield benefit of debt financing and the 
cost of financial distress when a firm uses debt beyond optimum level, managers need to make the decision 
about the mix of debt and equity financing that optimises firms' value. This study enlightens managers and 
stakeholders on the various factors which influence or determine debt in the capital structure. Specifically, the 
study examines the impact of profitability, non-debt tax shield, tangibility, liquidity, growth and firms' size on 
the choice of debt in the capital structure of firms listed on the FTSE 100. 
The framework of capital structure has been a subject of continuous academic debates since the 
Modigliani and Miller (m+m) study of 1958, yet still no satisfactory theoretical model has emerged. Many 
studies have been published to explain the behaviour of the firm with respect to the determinants of its corporate 
debt but have been unable to accurately describe firm's behaviour. Kouki and Said (2012) explained that the 
difficulty in implementing empirical tests is probably due to the approximations used to measure variables and 
under such circumstances, the results are insufficient in explaining the determinants of firms' debt.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958), in their capital structure Irrelevance theory argued that in a perfect 
market with no taxation and bankruptcy cost the value of a firm is independent of how it is financed. In 1963, 
m+m modified their earlier argument and explained that debt lowered the weighted average cost of capital and 
increased the value of a firm. Consequently, they argued that firms should borrow as much as possible to 
increase value and create shareholders' wealth. Following these arguments, a vast theoretical literature evolved 
which led to the formulation of alternative theories (Sbeiti 2010). Critics were of the view that firms cannot 
borrow infinitely because of the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy. These criticisms led to the proposition of 
alternate theories such as the Trade-off model and the Pecking order hypothesis to explain the determinants of 
capital structure. These theories argue that there is an optimum capital structure which a firm navigates towards 
and beyond this point; the utility for taking an additional unit of debt becomes negative. Hence, there is the limit 
to the use of debt in order to maximize the benefit of debt financing. 
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As the study of capital structure becomes more complex, the determinants of the structure of capital 
continued to be studied by academic scholars. Cortez and Susanto (2012), Sabir and Malik (2012), Sbeiti (2010) 
argued that the determinants of capital structure vary from country to country, and even from industry to industry 
within the same country. However, the focus of this paper is to identify the factors which determine capital 
structure and examine the relationship between these factors and the debt levels of firms listed on the FTSE 100. 
Although there are a number of theories which attempt to explain the determinants of capital structure, this 
research focuses on pecking order theory, trade off theory and agency cost theory.  
 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the study is to investigate the determinants of the capital structure of firms in the United Kingdom. 
Thus, in order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have been set: 
1. To evaluate the impact profitability (measured by the return on total asset) has on the debt decision of a firm. 
2. To evaluate the impact non-debt tax shield has on the debt decision of a firm.  
3. To evaluate the impact assets tangibility has on the debt decision of a firm.  
4. To evaluate the impact liquidity has on the debt decision of a firm. 
5. To evaluate the impact asset growth has on the debt decision of a firm.  
6. To evaluate the impact firm's size has on the debt decision of a firm.  
 
1.2 Organisation of the Study 
The remainder of this study is organised into four sections. Section two critically evaluates the relevant theories 
of capital structure, explains the various variables which determine debt in the capital structure and the expected 
signs predicted by theories. Section three is concerned with methodology adopted in this study while section four 
provides the analysis and the interpretation of the results. The last section highlights significant findings which 
directly addressed the research objectives, summarises the research findings and draw inferences based on 
observed data. 
 
2.0 Theoretical and empirical Review of Literature 
2.1 Modigliani and Miller (m+m) Theories 
Modigliani and Miller (m+m) proposed the capital structure irrelevance theory in 1958. The m+m irrelevance 
theory argues that in the absence of taxes, brokerage costs, solvency costs, and symmetric information between 
insiders and outsiders, the value of a firm is irrelevant of the way it is financed. Hence, a firm's value is 
determined by the performance of its real assets alone (Ross et al 2008). Furthermore, (Atrill 2012), Hillier et al 
(2010), Watson and Head (2013) explain that if  these factors are not present, the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) for all firms remain the same regardless of how the assets are financed. The implication is that 
there are no optimum capital structure that maximizes the value of firms and therefore no real determinants of 
the structure of capital. Thus, managers are better off concentrating their effort on a critical evaluation and 
management of the business to increase value.  
In 1963, m+m relaxed one of the assumptions of their initial capital structure Irrelevance theory, namely 
the absence of taxes and argued that the value of the levered firm and unlevered firm will be different because of 
the tax shield advantage of debt financing. As a firm increases its leverage, more of its profit is shielded from 
corporate taxation and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) decreases. Watson and Head (2013) explain 
that the lower the WACC, the higher the value of the firm. As a result, any manager who wants to maximize the 
value of the firm will focus on lowering the cost of capital. The implication is that there is an optimum capital 
structure that maximizes the value of the firm and this optimum is at the point where the firm is 100% financed 
by debt which does not conform to reality.  
These prepositions have formed the basis of modern thinking of the capital structure puzzle (Ahmad 
and Abbas 2011, Ahmed, Ahmed, and Ahmed 2010 and Amjad, Bilal, and Tufail 2013). However, critics argued 
that m+m did not take account of both the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy and financial distress 
associated with increased gearing in the capital structure so that firms cannot take on debt indefinitely (Watson 
and Head 2013). These criticisms eventually led to the proposition of alternate theories to explain the 
determinants of capital structure. Among these theories, are Trade-off Theory, Agency Cost Theory, and Pecking 
Order Theory which are be discussed below. 
 
2.2 Trade off Theory  
Trade-off Theory developed by Kraus and Litzebnerger (1973) is one of the earliest theories developed in 
response to the m+m studies of 1958 and 1963. The theory states that firms determine optimum capital structure 
by trading off both the benefits and the costs of debt financing. Firms will continue to borrow as long as the tax 
shield benefit of taking an additional unit of debt in the capital structure outweighs the marginal cost of debt 
financing (Cortez and Susanto 2012, Saleem et al 2013, Seelanatha 2010). However, a firm cannot take on debt 
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in its capital structure indefinitely because of bankruptcy costs. The more a firm borrows, the higher the risk of 
default to the point that both direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy can no longer be ignored (Kouki and Said 
2011, Lim 2012). Hence, there is an optimum capital structure which a firm navigates towards and beyond this 
optimum point, the value of the firm begins to fall due to the high risk associated with higher debt levels 
(Bundala 2012, Rasiah and Peong 2011). Therefore, a firm must find a compromise at the point of maximizing 
debt financing where the marginal cost outweighs the marginal benefit.  
 
2.3 Agency Cost Theory 
Agency cost theory was introduced based on information asymmetry between managers and investor by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stulz (1990) argued that the use 
of external financing in the presence of asymmetric information and incomplete contracting can give rise to the 
potential conflicts of interests between managers, stockholders and  bondholders. Agency theory assumes two 
types of conflict of interest: Firstly, the conflict between managers and shareholders and secondly, the conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders ( Amjad, Bilal, and Tufail 2013, Rehman and Rehman 2011). Agency 
theory argues that managers are agent of their principal and as agent they should act in the best interest of the 
shareholders but this is not always the case potentially resulting in conflict. As such, shareholders need to set up 
monitoring devices (which are costly) to ensure that managers are acting in their best interest (Ellili and Farouk 
2011, Ho-Yin Yue 2011). One way of reducing this conflict of interests is by increasing the gearing of the firm 
(Jensen 1986, Jucá, de Sousa and Fishlow 2012, and Rehman and Rehman 2011). High leverage in the capital 
structure put pressure on manager to generate cash flow to honour its debt obligations and reduce expected 
bankruptcy cost. This reduces the free cash flow available to managers to invest it in suboptimal project or 
misuse cash by consuming it on their perquisite. Accordingly, the interest of the manager and the shareholders 
would be aligned. However, higher gearing increases conflict of interest between shareholders (who are long 
term oriented and would relinquish short term profit for long term capital gain) and debt-holders who are short 
term oriented. To mitigate the fear of creditors, they usually lean on tangible assets of firms as collateral. By 
implication a firm take on more debt to reduce the conflict of interests between the different stakeholders.  
 
2.4 Pecking Order Theory 
This theory was pioneered by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). The theory is based on the idea of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. The proponents argued that managers of a firm are 
better informed than outside investors. That is, managers have more information on the investment decision and 
the return associated with a particular investment compared to outsiders. Managers better know the true value of 
a firm and the riskiness of that firm than outside investors and this make debt financing costly especially in times 
of poor financial performance. Debt-holders because of asymmetry information, charge higher interest rate to 
firms. Thus, to avoid this high rate, managers rely on internal financing such as retained earnings and move to 
using outside financing when this source becomes insufficient. Managers use internal financing, move to debt 
and finally to equity. This order is justified because in view of its fixed payments, debt is already less sensitive to 
information problems but incur issue costs, while internally generated resources do not suffer at all from issuing 
costs, information asymmetry and will not be undervalue (Ho-Yin Yue 2011, Sbeiti 2010). Issuing additional 
equity, in addition to the cost, suffers from information asymmetries and results in conflict between managers, 
existing shareholders and potential shareholders. This theory argues that there is no target level of gearing to 
which a firm navigates but companies use debt only when their internal funds are insufficient. Consequently, a 
firm's debt level is not driven by Trade-off theory but simply the attempt by managers to reduce information 
asymmetry (Amjad, Bilal, and Tufail  2013, Cortez and Susanto, 2012, and Nguyen and Nguyen 2012).   
 
2.5 Other Theories of Capital Structure 
Other theories have been developed by researchers over the years in reaction to the m+m studies of 1958 and 
1963. Such theories include Signalling Theory which was developed by Leland and Pyle (1977)and Ross 
(1977),Dynamic Trade off Theory developed byFischer et al (1989)and Market Timing Theory of Bakerand 
Wurgler (2002).However, over the years, empirical research in the determinants of capital structures are usually 
modelled in line with pecking order theory or trade of theory with some finding evidence in support of agency 
cost theory (Kayo and Kimura 2011, Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov 2013, Nguyen and Nguyen 2012). Recently 
Trade-off adjusted Order Theory was proposed by Cortez and Susanto (2012). The theory is based on their 
findings that the capital structure determinants are predicted in both static trade off theory and pecking order 
theory but none of the theories shows a more dominant predictive capability over the other. The theory argued 
that firms will keep comparing the cost of debt and equity as in trade off theory. As long as the difference 
between cost of debt and equity does not reach certain level, even if the cost of equity is higher, firm will 
continue to use equity as their main source of finance. However, this order will change when the difference 
between the cost of debt and equity passes certain threshold.  
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2.6 Empirical Evidence 
In this section, the specific determinants of capital structure are presented together with discussion of the 
relevant empirical evidence. Although, several factors have been identified in literatures, this study focuses on 
profitability, non-debt tax shield, tangibility, liquidity, assets growth, and firms' size. 
2.6.1 Profitability 
According to Pecking Order Theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), firms use internal sources of 
financing because it is cheaper and move to debt financing if this source is insufficient. In other word, the more 
profitable a firm is the less debt will be in its capital structure depicting a negative relationship between debt and 
profitability. This reflects managers’ attitude to the handling of the conflict between the bond-holder and the 
shareholders. Empirical evidence in support of pecking order theory includes the studyof Akhtar (2005), AL- 
Shubiri (2010), Crnigoj and Mramor (2009), and Smith (2012).  
On the other hand, according Trade-off Theory, a more profitable firm will use more debt because of its 
tax-shield benefit and because profitable firms have decreased in expected bankruptcy cost (Sbeiti 2010). The 
trade-off theory advocates that profitable firms are perceived to have lower risk of bankruptcy and due to the fact 
that interest expenses are tax deductible, they use more debt in their capital structure. Hence, a firm's profitability 
is expected to be positively correlated with leverage. Empirical works in support of trade of theory include the 
study of Teker, Tasseven, and Tukel, (2009), Kaur, and Rao (2009). Although several measures of profitability 
exist in practice, this study uses return on assets (ROA) in line with Berger et al. (1997), Gaud, Hoesli and 
Bender (2007) and Lim (2012). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed 
H0: Profitability does not significantly impact leverage 
H1: Profitability significantly impact leverage  
2.6.2 Non-Debt Tax Shield 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Static Trade-off Theory of Kraus and Litzebnerger (1973), debt 
tax shield (interest) serve as an incentives to use more debt in the capital structure. This is because this debt tax 
shield is treated as tax deductible. Thus, a firm gains more when some of its return to investors is exempted from 
taxation. However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) put forward that Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) such as 
depreciation expenses and investment tax credit could be regard as substitutes for tax benefits of debt financing 
and as such, firms with more or large non debt tax shield expenses need not take more debt in its capital structure. 
Hence, NDTS is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage. The empirical work of Bowen, Daley, and 
Huber (1982), Chen (2004), Lim (2012), and Wald 1999 confirm this relationship. Contrarily, some authors such 
as Al-Qudah (2011) and Bayrakdaroğlu,  Ege, and Yazıcı (2013) have also found positive relationship between 
Non Debt Tax Shield and leverage which is the opposite of the assertion of Boquist and Moore (1984), Bradley 
Jarell and Kim (1984), Huang and Song (2006), and Chang, Lee and Lee (2009). The argument remains if NDTS 
determine leverage significantly and in what direction. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
H0: None Debt Tax Shield does not significantly impact leverage level 
H1: Non debt tax shield significantly impact leverage level   
2.6.3 Tangibility 
According to agency cost theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers are agent of the shareholders and 
there is the possibility of conflict between managers and shareholders and between shareholders and bondholders. 
Thus, lenders undertake more risks when shareholders make sub-optimal investment decisions and therefore will 
acquire one or more assets of the firm as collateral to mitigate their risk (Ellili and Farouk 2011, Harris and 
Raviv 1991). As argued by Lim (2012), a firm with significant proportion of fixed assets are associated with 
high ability to repay loan and therefore able to raise more debt capital easily. Therefore, tangibility is expected to 
positively impact leverage. The work of Nunkoo and Boateng (2010), Shah and Khan (2007),Teker, Tasseven 
and Tukel (2009) confirm positive relationship.  
A contrary opinion is expressed by Grossman and Hart (1982) who argued that there is a negative 
relationship between tangibility and leverage. They explained that due to agency relationship, companies 
monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour. These monitory costs are higher in firms with lower tangible assets 
because of the perquisites’ consumption by the managers. In order to reduce this cost, firms prefer higher debt in 
its capital structure. This has been confirmed by Akinlo et al (2011), Booth et al (2001), Sayılgan et al (2006). 
Furthermore, other authors such as Ebadi, Chan and Yap (2011), Hall et al (2004) stressed that the relationship 
between leverage and tangibility is influenced by the type of debt. Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov (2013) and 
Sogorb-Mira (2005) found inverse relationship between tangibility and short term debt and direct relationship 
with long term debt. The argument is to determine what impact tangibility has on leverage. Hence, the third 
hypothesis is: 
H0: A firm's tangibility does not significantly impact leverage 
H1: A firm's tangibility significantly impact leverage 
2.6.4 Liquidity 
Several research works have used liquidity as an explanatory variable on capital structure determinants. 
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Liquidity is the ability of the firm to meet its short term obligation as they fall due. Ozkan (2001) reported that 
higher liquidity ratio implies that a firm has more power to re-pay its debt. Pecking order theory (POT) 
advocates that the higher the firms financing ability internally, the lesser it will depend on outside sources of 
finance such as debt financing. This means that a firm with higher liquidity will use less debt in its capital 
structure. In this respect, liquidity will be expected to have a negative relationship with leverage. This is 
confirmed by the work of Guney et al. (2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010), Tong and Green (2005). The results 
of Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) against expectation showed a negative coefficient between debt and liquidity in 
support of POT and they concluded that firms avoid interest rate and liquidity risk. 
On the other hand, according to trade off theory, a firm with higher ability to take on more debt will 
probably do so in order to maximize the tax benefit of debt financing. A firm with higher liquidity will exercise 
its option of debt to maximize the benefit of debt financing. Therefore, liquidity is expected to have a positive 
relationship with leverage of firms as confirmed by the work of Yu (2000). Generally, the interest of this 
research is to determine what impact liquidity has on leverage and thus: 
H0: Liquidity of a firm does not significantly impact gearing 
H1: Liquidity of a firm significantly impact gearing 
2.6.5 Asset Growth 
Empirical research on the relationship between growth and the capital structure of a firm is ambiguous and 
conflicting (Ellili, and Farouk 2011, Nguyen, and Nguyen 2012). According to Pecking Order Theory, firms turn 
to debt financing when retained earnings are insufficient to finance growth opportunity. High growing firm 
usually require lots of capital and most cases the retained earnings or the company cash flows may not be 
sufficient to finance it (Ebadi, Chan and Yap 2011 and Lim 2012). In this case, a positive relationship will be 
expected between growth and gearing as confirmed by Anwar (2012), Baral (2004), Céspedes et al. (2010),Gill, 
et al (2009),Sharif, Naeem, and Khan (2012),Yang, et al (2010).  
On the other hand, the trade-off theory argues that the cost of financial distress increases as firm grows. 
This suggests that lender will require more tangible assets as collateral for loan. Since growth opportunities 
cannot be collateralized because it is intangible, firms tend to issue less debt (Chen, 2004). Myer (1977) argued 
that firms investing in assets that may generate high growth opportunity in the future face difficulties in 
borrowing against such assets. In respect of this, it is expected that growth will be negatively correlated with 
leverage. This is confirmed by the empirical results of Akinlo et al. (2011), Eriotis (2007),Shah and Khan (2007). 
Thus: 
H0: Asset growth does not significantly impact gearing levels 
H1: Asset growth significantly impact gearing levels 
2.6.6 Size of Firms 
There are several theoretical assumptions why the size of firms is associated with the structure of capital 
(Keshtkar, Valipour, and Javanmard 2012). Pecking order theory hypothesize that size is negatively correlated 
with leverage. Larger firms have more stable cash flows and are well diversified. Because their internally 
generated revenue is large, these firms will rely less on outside financing such as debt capital. Therefore, size is 
expected to negatively correlate leverage or gearing as the results of Frank and Goyal (2003)and Titman and 
Wessels (1988) have confirmed. On the other hand, Trade-off Theory states that firms determine their capital 
structure by trading off the benefits and the costs of debt. Larger firms are more diversified and often have more 
stable cash flows and are viewed as less risky than smaller ones. Therefore, investors will be willing to lend 
more to larger firms connoting a positive relationship will exist between leverage and size as confirmed by the 
results of AL- Shubiri(2010),Sharif Naeem, and Khan (2012),Gurcharan (2010)and Liu and Ren (2009). 
Furthermore, it has been reported that larger firms prefer long term debt while smaller firms prefer short term 
debts (Chen, 2004, Keshtkar, Valipour and Javanmard 2012, Marsh 1982). If this is so, size will be positively 
correlated with long term debt and negatively correlated with short term debt. Hence: 
H0: Size of firms does not significantly impact the gearing levels 
H1: Size of firm significantly impacts the gearing levels 
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.1 Data Source 
The study makes use of secondary data such a journal articles, textbooks and FAME data base. The study makes 
use of financial reports of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, FTSE 100 for a period of ten (10) 
years, from 2003 to 2012. The financial variables of interest for this period are collected in order to permit a 
sound comparative study over time. Also, because the analysis will be subject to regression, longer length of 
time will help eliminate some of the errors encountered for time series analysis or cross sectional analysis. The 
data for the study are obtained from financial data of firms published on the FAME DATABASE. The choice of 
secondary data is due to the nature of topic under investigation and the fact that financial reports of firms are 
readily available and accessible to the general public.  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.13, 2016 
 
64 
3.2 Model Estimation 
The relationship between leverage of firms and the various determinants of capital structure is represented in the 
model below:  
LEVit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2NDTSit + β3TANGit + β4LIQit + β5GRit + β6SIZEit + Ɛit 
Where i= is observed firms (65) 
          t= is years (10) 
To estimate the research model, time series data are combined with cross-sectional data to form a panel 
data analysis. The panel data are analysed as a Fixed Effect Panel Data Analysis (FEM). Also, VIF test was 
carried out to determine the presence of multicolinearity but results showed no such problem. The Distribution 
Free Wald Test and the Durbin-Watson test were used to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation respectively. The results revealed the presence of these errors and the model was corrected using 
heteroskedasticity corrected model.   The P-value is used to determine the significant of the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and the explained variables. To do this, a significant level of 5% was set. Thus, if the 
P-value is less than 5%, the regression coefficient is said to be statistically significant and if it is greater than 5%, 
the regression coefficient is statistically insignificant. Also, to determine the fitness of the overall equation or the 
regression model, the ANOVA table was set and the F-Fisher test known as F-value are used to evaluate the 
overall significant or the goodness of fit of the model.  
The use of quantitative approach is in line with previous researchers such Ahmed, Ahmed and Ahmed 
(2010), Anwar (2012), Cortez and Susanto (2012), Kouka and Said (2012) who also used this approach in their 
study.  
 
3.3 Variable Measurements 
The variables in this research are divided into dependent and independent variables. The study analyses capital 
structure proxy by debt ratio as the dependent variable and the determinants proxy by profitability, non-debt tax 
shield, tangibility, liquidity, growth and size as the explanatory variables.  
3.3.1 Dependent Variables (Structure of Capital) 
This study uses three measures of gearing in line with the study of Ellili and Farouk (2011). Hence, capital 
structure is calculated as: 
 
DEBTSTD     =              (1) 
 
DEBTLTD      =                      (2) 
 
DEBTTD         =                             (3) 
Where DEBTSTD = the short term debt divided by the total assets of the firm  
 DEBTLTD = the long term debt divided by the total assets of the firm 
 DEBTTD =the total debt (DEBTSTD + DEBTLTD) divided by the total assets of the firm. 
The total assets of the firms under investigation are used because assets better measure the use of firm 
resources to generate return. The effectiveness of a firm is sometimes measure in the amount of the assets it 
possesses. Moreover, the total asset of a firm is the combination of its total debt and equity. Therefore, it is the 
most appropriate measure to be used. 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables (Determinants) 
The study makes use of a number of explanatory variables to explain the determinants of capital structure of 
firms. These variables, their measurements and expected relationship according to theory predictions are 
explained below: 
Table 3.1 Predicted Signs and Theory Supported 
Variables  Proxy By Pecking Order 
Theory 
Trade off Theory  
Prof (ROA) Operating profit/ Total Assets - + 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) Depreciation/Total Assets  - 
Tangibility(TANG) Tangible Assets/Total Assets - + 
 Liquidity (LIQ) Current assets/current liability - + 
Growth (GR) % Growth in total assets + - 
Size of Firms(SIZE) Total Assets - + 
Source: The researcher from data gathered 
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4.0 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1: Summary of Statistics of the Independent and Dependent Variables 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
DEBTSTD (%) 650 0.000000 0.904350 0.271758 0.139427 
DEBTLT (%) 650 0.000000 0.927637 0.341137 0.163207 
DEBTTD (%) 650 0.000000 1.15082 0.613214 0.179302 
ROA (%) 650 -0.518300 0.562200 0.0953734 0.0878227 
NDTS (%) 650 0.000000 0.158137 0.0300431 0.0235876 
TANG (%) 650 0.000000 0.988545 0.663462 0.193757 
LIQ (Ratio) 650 0.110000 60.4700 1.33178 3.09821 
GR (%) 650 -0.944375 3.75109 0.120552 0.321949 
SIZE (%) 650 5.24702 12.2775 8.74952 1.41321 
Source: Output results of Gretl Computed from the 65 firms observed over 10 years 
The table 4.1 above show the descriptive statistics of the data. While debt capital make up 34% of the 
long term financing on the average, the financial leverage of firms comprises 61% debt financing as seen by 
DEBTTD of 0.61. However, some firms seem to be heavily leveraged as seen by the maximum of 0.93 of 
DBTLT. Performance proxy by ROA has a mean average of 10% for the 65 firms observed, a minimum of -52% 
and a maximum of 56%. The loss of 51% seen in the sample period is probably due to the effect of the financial 
meltdown of 2008 – 09 as the sample period span over the period of economic depression. Despite the low 
profitability and performance of firms during the sample period and huge short term debt, the liquidity position 
of the firms seems fair as could be observed from the mean figure of 1.33. While average tangibility reveals that 
66% of total assets is tangible, the mean of size is 8.7 with a minimum of 5.2 and a maximum of 12.3. Statistics 
show that the firms grow at an average of 12% and non-debt tax shield has an average of 3%. 
 
4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 4.2. Correlation coefficient between variables and the VIF indicators 
Variables DEBTLTD DEBTTD ROA NDTS TANG LIQ GR SIZE VIF 
DEBTSTD -0.3064** 0.4990** 0.0855** 0.0540 -0.5653** -0.2315** 0.0112 -0.1146** - 
DEBTLTD  0.6719** -0.1464**  0.0590 0.2327** -0.0432 0.0918* 0.1426** - 
DEBTTD    -0.0668 0.0953** -0.2282** -0.2194** 0.0920* 0.0403 - 
ROA    0.2770** -0.1895** -0.0500 0.0158 -0.0442 1.138 
NDTS     0.0236 -0.1394** -0.0284 0.0219 1.105 
TANG      -0.2896** -0.0788 0.4370** 1.379 
LIQ       0.0297 -0.1790** 1.123 
GR        -0.0405 1.007 
SIZE         1.243 
Source: Gretl output of data extracted from FAME 
** Significant at 5% level 
**cut off = 0.0769 
The short term debt shows a significant correlation with ROA, TANG, LIQ and SIZE but the 
coefficient of correlation are insignificant for NDTS and GR. The positive relationship with NDTS, GR and the 
negative association with TANG is consistent with the work of Bayrakdaroğlu, Ege, and Yazıcı (2013) while the 
negative association with size contradicts the results of Al-Qudah (2011). 
The long term debt also shows a negative coefficient with ROA and LIQ confirming the results of 
Sbeiti (2010) and pecking order theory. Also, the DEBTLTD shows a positive coefficient with NDTS, TANG, 
GROWTH and SIZE which is consistent with the results of Al-Qudah (2011) except for the tangibility which 
showed a negative relationship. These imply that long term debt decrease with increase in profitability and 
liquidity but increase with increase in non-debt tax shield, growth, tangibility and size of firm.  
 
4.3 Regression Results and Hypotheses/Model Testing 
In order to test the hypotheses set, a panel data with FEM analysis is undertaken and the results are presented 
below. The table 4.3 below shows the results of the regression for the short terms debt, long term debts and the 
total debt and the determinants of capital structure.  
The model for the regression analysis is presented below: 
LEVit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2NDTSit + β3TANGit + β4LIQit + β5GRit + β6SIZEit + Ɛit 
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Table 4.3. Panel Data Regression Results (Fixed Effect Model) 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
DEBTSTD 
(p-value) 
DEBTLTD 
(p-value) 
DEBTTD 
(p-value) 
Const 0.6523       
(0.0000***) 
0.08122            
(0.0687*) 
0.6900            
(0.0000***) 
PROF (ROA) -0.0009   
(0.0332**) 
-0.0019      
(0.0021***) 
-0.0039       
(0.0000***) 
NDTS 0.1470         
(0.2559) 
0.6506            
(0.0066***) 
0.9433               
(0.0005***) 
TANG -0.5527       
(0.0000***) 
0.2231              
(0.0000***) 
-0.4381             
(0.0000***) 
LIQ -0.0604    
(0.0000***) 
0.0158        
(0.0042***) 
-0.0261          
 (0.0000***) 
GROWTH (GR) -0.0015  
 (0.8942) 
0.0307            
(0.1748) 
0.0489             
(0.0132**) 
SIZE 0.0070     
(0.0022***) 
0.0105          
(0.0291**) 
0.0291            
 (0.0000***) 
R Square 0.5471 0.1178 0.2685 
Adj R-Square 0.5429 0.1096 0.2616 
F(6, 643) 129.4708          
(0.0000***) 
14.3126               
(0.0000***) 
39.3305 
(0.0000***) 
Source: Data extracted from regression output 
*** Significant at a level of 1% 
** Significant at a level of 5% 
4.3.1 Profitability (ROA) 
The return on total assets has negative and significant impact on the three levels of gearing of firms. The 
negative impact of Profitability on leverage indicates that there is an inverse movement between these two 
variables. The results of this research support the Pecking Order Theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers 
(1984) and consistence with the findings of Qiu and La (2010), Ahmed, Ahmed and Ahmed (2010), Afza and 
Ahmed (2010) but contradicts the findings of Teker, Tasseven, and Tukel (2009) who found a positive impact of 
profitability on leverage. The results reveal that firms do not use debt because of the tax shield benefit of debt as 
advocated by TOT but do so when internal source is insufficient.  
4.3.2Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS)  
The Non Debt Tax Shield reveals a positive relationship with all three measures of leverage. However, the 
impact of NDTS on the short term leverage (DEBTSTD) is not significant but NDTS has a significant effect on 
the Long term debt (DEBTLTD) and total debt (DEBTTD) at 1% significant level. The insignificant impact 
indicates that depreciation expenses are not considered when taking on short term debt. This explanation is due 
to the logic that short term debt does not need asset collateral which is associated with long term debts. It could 
be argued that depreciation expenses increases as more fixed assets are acquired by the organisation. If this is the 
case, firm with more depreciable assets will likely secure more long term debt to finance their operations. This 
finding agree with the results of Huang and Song (2006), Bradley et al. (1984) and Bayrakdaroğlu, Ege and 
Yazıcı (2013) but contradict the study of Cortez and Susanto (2012) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). The 
result rejects the argument NDTS serve as a substitute for Debt tax shield and act as incentive to use more debt 
in the capital structure.  
4.3.3 Tangibility (TANG) 
Tangibility negatively and significantly impacts the short term and total leverage but positively and significantly 
impact the long term leverage. The positive impact on the long term debt indicates that debt increases as 
organisation acquire more fixed assets and this is consistent with the results of Afza and Hussain (2011), Lim 
(2012), Nadem et al (2012), Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) but contradicts Ahmad and Abbas (2011) who found a 
negative impact of tangibility on long term leverage. Also, the result supports the Agency Cost Theory and TOT 
of Capital Structure. The Trade-off Theory advocates that firm determines capital structure by trading the benefit 
and the costs of debt financing. Thus, a firm with large amount of tangible assets will be better placed to secure 
loan from lenders. On the other hand, tangibility has a negative impact on the short term leverage of firms in line 
with Ebadi, Chan and Yap (2011), Hall et al (2004), Mateev, Poutziouris and Ivanov (2013), Sogorb-Mira (2005). 
Earlier, these authors explained that the relationship between debt and tangible assets is influenced by the type of 
debt as confirmed above. Since, collateral are not required to secure a short term debt, the negative relationship 
was expected. 
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4.3.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity has a statistically significant impact on the three levels of gearing at 1% level. The negative impact of 
liquidity on short term debts indicates that firms avoid liquidity problem by taking lesser debt in its capital 
structure while the positive impact on long term debts shows firms take advantage of their strong liquidity 
position in exploiting the tax advantage of debt financing as purported by the Trade-off Theory of capital 
structure. The negative impact agrees with the empirical work of Tong and Green (2005), Childs, Mauer, and 
Ott(2005), Guney et al. (2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010) while positive impact agrees with the empirical work 
of Yu (2000). Accordingly, the results support both POT and TOT of capital structure.  
4.3.5 Assets Growth 
Growth of firms are found to negatively impact the short term (DEBTSTD) but positively impact the long term 
and total debt of the firms. However, only the coefficient of the total leverage is significant at 5% level. The 
result shows that growth is not a significant factor in determining the long term debt of firm. This is expected as 
larger firms growth rate slows and as such does not play a significant role in determining debt. Also, the result of 
profitability indicates that these firms strongly finance their assets with internal funding probably due to their 
large cash flows. Although not significant, the positive impact on long term debt confirms the POT and 
consistence with findings of Baral (2004), Céspedes et al. (2010), Chen (2004),Yang, et al (2010). This is 
consistent with the study of Ahmed, Ahmed, and Ahmed (2010). Similarly, the impact of growth on the short 
term debt is insignificant in line with the study of Ellili and Farouk (2011), Saleem et al (2013). Again, the 
positive relationship of growth with total debts agrees with previous findings of Ellili and Farouk (2011), Al-
Qudah (2011), Bayrakdaroğlu, Ege and Yazıcı (2013) except their results were not significant.  
4.3.6 Size of Firms 
Size of firms has positive and significant impact on all three levels of debts. This means that the larger the firm, 
the more debt it will have it its capital structure. The significant impact on short term debt indicates the 
willingness of lenders to lend on a short term basis to firms probably due to the impact of the melt down. The 
positive and significant impact is consistent with the TOT and the empirical results of Akhtar (2005), Akinlo et 
al. (2011), AL- Shubiri (2010), and Gurcharan (2010).  
 
4.4 Observed Signs and Theories Supported 
Having analysed and discuss the results of the findings in section 4.4 above, the results are summarised below. 
Table 4.4 Observed Signs and Theories Confirmed 
Variables  Observed Sign Theory Confirmed 
ROA - Pecking Order Theory 
NDTS +  
TANG -/+ Agency Cost/Trade-off Theory 
LIQ -/+ Pecking Order Theory/Trade off Theory 
GROWTH + Pecking Order Theory 
SIZE + Trade-off Theory 
Source: Generated from results of hypotheses testing 
The table shows profitability and growth support POT while size show support for TOT. Tangibility 
support TOT and agency cost theory while the impact of liquidity is mixed. The results also show that the impact 
of tangibility depends on the type of debt, whether it be long or short term debt. NDTS contradicts the TOT and 
shows a positive impact on the three level of gearing.  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This study examined the determinants of capital structure of London FTSE 100 firms using a panel data analysis 
(Fixed Effect Model). The study made use of three levels of leverage which include the short term leverage, the 
long term leverage and the total leverage to explain the capital structure of the sampled firms. The empirical 
analysis enable the researcher to classify the determinants of capital structure into Profitability, Non-Debt tax 
shields, Tangibility of assets, liquidity, growth and size of the firms. The panel data fixed effect results reveal 
that firm adjust their corporate debt level in line with Pecking order Model and Trade-off between the benefit 
and the cost of debt financing. Furthermore, against prediction, the NDTS does not show result consistent with 
trade off model, an indication that this may not serve as an alternative to debt tax shield as argued in finance 
literature. Overall, the results show that managers will adjust their debt level in response to internal need of firms 
and as well as the trade-off between the benefit and costs of debt financing. Findings also revealed large firms 
have advantage in securing short term debt and long term debt, consistent with Trade-off Theory. Thus, 
managers are subtle in their dealing with creditors and usually present the firm as a stable and well diversified 
firm when negotiating a short term debt or credit. Finally, firms' management are advised to seek more external 
funding in the wake of the boom presently kick starting especially in time where interest rate and taxes are at 
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their minimum in the economy. This is to enable firms benefit from the tax shield benefit of debt and the 
advantage possess by this big firms. Since firms have significant proportion of their assets as tangible, this will 
eliminate many of the agency problems that may be associated from the issue of debt financing. 
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Appendix 1: List of all FTSE 100 Non- Financial Firms as 5th March 2013 
Company Sector Market cap (£bn) Employees 
Royal Dutch Shell  Oil and gas 135 90,000 
BP Oil and gas 85 97,700 
Vodafone Group  Telecomms 83 86,373 
GlaxoSmithKline  Pharmaceuticals 73 97,389 
British American Tobacco Tobacco 69 87,813 
SABMiller  Beverages 53 70,000 
Diageo  Beverages 50 25,000 
Rio Tinto Group  Mining 48 67,930 
BHP Billiton Mining 44 46,370 
BG Group  Oil and gas 49 6,625 
AstraZeneca  Pharmaceuticals 38 57,200 
Xstrata  Mining 35 38,561 
Unilever  Consumer goods 34 171,000 
Reckitt Benckiser  Consumer goods 32 32,000 
Tesco Supermarket 29 519,671 
Glencore International  Mining 27 57,656 
National Grid plc Energy 26 27,000 
Anglo American plc Mining 26 100,000 
Imperial Tobacco Group  Tobacco 24 38,200 
BT Group Telecomms 20 89,000 
Rolls-Royce Group  Manufacturing 19 40,000 
Centrica  Energy 18 40,000 
Compass Group  Food 15 471,108 
Associated British Foods Food 14 102,000 
BSkyB  Media 14 22,800 
SSE plc Energy 13 20,000 
WPP plc  Media 13 162,000 
ARM Holdings  IT 13 2,000 
BAE Systems  Military 11.8 107,000 
Shire plc  Pharmaceuticals 11.7 4,200 
Experian  Information 11.7 17,000 
Tullow Oil  Oil and gas 11.2 890 
CRH plc  Building materials 10.9 76,433 
Fresnillo plc  Mining 10.8 2,449 
Antofagasta  Mining 10.7 4,005 
Pearson plc Publishing 9.6 37,000 
Wolseley plc Building materials 9.1 44,000 
Reed Elsevier  Publishing 8.9 30,200 
Next plc  Retail clothing 6.9 58,706 
Kingfisher plc Retail homeware 6.7 80,000 
Land Securities Group  Property 6.6 700 
Morrison Supermarkets  Supermarket 6.5 132,000 
J Sainsbury plc  Supermarket 6.5 150,000 
Smith & Nephew Medical 6.4 11,000 
Burberry Group  Fashion 6.1 9,000 
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Company Sector Market cap (£bn) Employees 
Marks & Spencer Group  Supermarket 5.9 81,223 
Capita Group  Support Services 5.9 46,500 
InterContinental Hotels Group  Hotels 5.7 345,000 
Intertek Group  Product testing 5.5 33,000 
British Land Co  Property 5.1 177 
Petrofac Oil and gas 5.1 18,200 
United Utilities  Water 5.0 5,096 
Smiths Group  Engineering 5.0 23,550 
Weir Group Engineering 5.0 14,000 
Aberdeen Asset Management  Fund management 4.9 1,800 
Randgold Resources  Mining 4.9 6,954 
Johnson Matthey  Chemicals 4.9 9,700 
ITV Media 4.8 4,059 
Aggreko  Generator hire 4.6 4,262 
Carnival plc  Leisure 4.6 86,800 
Whitbread  Retail hospitality 4.5 86,800 
International Consolidated Airlines Group SA Transport air 4.5 58,476 
GKN  Manufacturing 4.4 40,000 
Eurasian Natural Resources  Mining 4.3 72,000 
Bunzl  Industrial products 4.3 12,368 
Sage Group  IT 4.3 12,300 
G4S Security 4.1 657,125 
Rexam  Packaging 4.1 19,000 
IMI plc Engineering 3.9 14,700 
Babcock International  Consulting 3.9 25,000 
Tate & Lyle  Food 3.9 5,616 
Severn Trent  Water 3.8 8,051 
Polymetal International  Mining 3.7 8,051 
Hammerson  Property 3.7 277 
Resolution plc  Investment 3.7 40 
Meggitt  Engineering 3.6 7,370 
Croda International  Chemicals 3.5 3,200 
TUI Travel Leisure 3.5 53,000 
Evraz Mining 3.5 110,000 
AMEC  Consulting 3.3 29,000 
Serco Group  Outsourced services 3.1 100,000 
Vedanta Resources  Mining 1.2 32,000 
Wood Group Oil and gas 0.8 41,000 
Kazakhmys  Oil and gas 0.5 61,000 
Intu Properties Property services 0.3 600 
 
 
 
